Was J.S. Mill a Descriptionist?

At first glance it may seem that the question of whether J.S. Mill was, or was not, a descriptionist has been solved once and for all. It is commonly assumed that with respect to general terms, like 'man', Mill was a descriptionist, while with respect to proper names, like 'Aristotle', he was not. The author finds this answer questionable. He believes that 'The System of Logic' lends support to a different interpretation of proper names. Finally the author shows that it is possible to distinguish between type and token use of proper names. The token use is especially interesting. A language user can apply a proper name as a token even though he/she neither associates any descriptive content with the name nor does he/she act within a causal chain of the name application. Basic elements of this position are outlined and the author discusses its soundness against stock arguments used in the controversy between the descriptive and causal interpretation of name use.