Eugenii Blausteinowej z Ginsbergów krytyka Husserlowskiej teorii całości i części na tle tez ontologii egzystencjalnej Romana Ingardena

The purpose of this article is to reconstruct Ginsberg's critique of Husserl's (semi-formal) whole and part theory. In order to clarify Ginsberg's position I refer to the terms introduced into ontological discourse by Roman Ingarden. Unfortunately, neither Husserl's whole-parts theory, nor Ginsberg's work on inseparability/separability, despite their undeniable merits, has attracted strong interest among many philosophers. But one could, for instance, fruitfully investigate whether their detailed analyses of whole-part theory, inseparability/separability, different kinds of relations, and forms of dependence, have something of value to offer in the current discussions in continental philosophy, or even in analytic philosophy of modern ontology. According to Husserl's intuition, these topics are fundamental to ontology and therefore they are still relevant; there is still much to learn from those painstaking investigations of ontological relations. In this article, I do not discuss Ginsberg's criticism of the intentional or “psychologistic” approach to the question of inseparability/separability, because it is worth discussing in a separate paper.