Czy hipoteza Wielkiej Iluzji jest problemem dla teorii percepcji?

An argument from illusion assumes that the illusion occurring in perception is a reason to redefine the ordinary account of perception as a direct and immediate access to reality, therefore it suffice to refute a direct realism. Many theories of perception where arisen to address the problem, the most popular ones are: the sense-datum theory, the adverbial theory, the intentionalist theory and the most recent the disjunctivist theory. Recent work in psychology and philosophy of mind on change blindness and related phenomena elicit a new skepticism about the nature of perception which is called a grand illusion hypothesis. It seems that doubts engendered by this hypothesis goes even further than those of the argument from illusion, because it suggests that subjects have a radically false beliefs about what their perceptual experience is like. I ’d like to consider the number of ways of understanding the hypothesis and evaluate them. It seems that we have tree ways of coping with the grand illusion problem: accepting the new skeptic account (Dennett, Blackmore i Rensink), rebuilt the theory of perception so it avoids the problem (Noe, O’Regan, A. Clark) or show the grand illusion isn’t really that grand, actually it’s modest and familiar one, but at the same time it teaches us a lot about the nature of visual perception (Cohen, Siewert, Mack).