PREČO EXTERIALISTICKÉ KRITÉRIÁ ZDÔVODNENIA PRINCIPIÁLNE ZLYHÁVAJÚ?

The article concerns two basic approaches to the problem of epistemic belief-justification: internalism and externalism. The article aims to showing that internalism as well as externalism, when confronted with the problem of philosophical scepticism, face various kinds of problems, which lead to implausibility of their respective accounts of justification. The author provides a special focus on the externalist approach which was invented as a direct response to the threat of scepticism. The central part of the article contains a brief analysis of main attributes of externalism, and subsequently its criticism which aims to showing that the criteria of justification proposed by externalists do not accomplish the basic function of distinguishing between justified and unjustified beliefs. The author argues that the discussed deficiencies of externalism result from its elementary rationale, which implies that they are incurable, and therefore the externalist criteria of justification inevitably fail.