SKEPTICKÉ INTUÍCIE

The goal of this paper is to provide answers for two key questions concerning epistemic intuitions in the context of sceptical arguments: (1) What is the nature of these intuitions? (2) Do they provide evidence or justification for the premises of these arguments? In contemporary literature on scepticism, the precise propositional contents of our „sceptical“ intuitions are rarely identified. The author considers several possible ways of identifying them and concludes that our intuitive answers to various sceptical thought experiments are the best means of capturing the propositional content of our intuitions. This conclusion is based on the argument from philosophical usage of the terms „intuition“, „intuitive“ and the like. Moreover, the author proposes a theory of the origin of sceptical intuitions. He argues that these intuitions are products of our language competence. Further, he shows that if this theory was true, it would not lend support to the idea that sceptical intuitions provide evidence or justification for the premises of sceptical arguments.