The problem of God’s omniscience in the context of the analytical metaphysics of time

The article is concerned with an important philosophical and theological dilemma: how to square God’s omniscience with human freedom. The author tries to address the problem from the perspective of time theory, rather than theology, and draws on contemporary disputes over the essence of time within analytical metaphysics. The article deals with two main approaches to the nature of time: the A-Theory and the B-Theory. It is proved that the ethernalistic theory, one of the most famous solutions of the dilemma, supported by Boethius and Thomas Aquinas, presupposes the understanding of time which is characteristic of the B-Theory. The author proves that both the ethernalistic theory and the B-Theory lead to determinism. He proposes the solution resting on the A-Theory. According to the solution, God knows all the future scenarios but does not know which of them will be chosen by a person. This solution is close to the open-theistic approach in the contemporary philosophy of religion. The author shows that the proposed solution does not minimize God’s perfection.