Karol Wojtyła on the metaphysics of the person

The article undertakes the issue of metaphysical subjectivity in the philosophy of the human person developed by Karol Wojtyła. He drew extensively upon the notion of suppositum but there is no systematic exposition of the concept in his work. The article undertakes the task of investigating the issue. First, Wojtyła’s approach to metaphysics is presented. Second, the paper sets out the philosopher’s understanding of suppositum. Finally, some further clarifications are developed, including those helping to better understand the association of the metaphysical subjectivity with the personal. Wojtyła’s concept of suppositum requires a stronger reference to a pro-personalistic notion of substance. The latter seems to be offered by an original project of Thomistic metaphysics presented by W. Norris Clarke. The last part of the paper is an attempt at demonstration of the complementarity of metaphysical ideas of these two philosophers.