The rationalisation of parliamentary responsibility of the government in the French semi-presidential architecture

The paper deals with the parliamentary responsibility of the government under the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic of 1958 (with special regard to a vote of no confidence). Looking at this issue from a contemporary perspective, the author argues that in comparison to the so-called monistic version of parliamentarianism, this type of political responsibility of the executive has been doubly weakened. First of all, the mere rationalisation of a parliamentary system itself occurring at the constitutional level has contributed to such an effect. Strengthening the government at the expense of the legislative is of prime importance in this regard. Another factor which weakens the position of the legislature is far-reaching reinforcement of the French presidency, which corresponds to the process of presidentialisation of politics. This has led to the creation (outside the provisions of the 1958 Constitution) of an additional dimension of the government’s responsibility, that is the responsibility before the head of state. The author claims that in such circumstances, a vote of no confidence may be paradoxically perceived not so much as a mechanism that links the French system of government with a parliamentary model, but as one of the factors supporting the so-called majoritarian presidentialism.