Criticism and the Models of Scientific Rationality

In the article, the authoress mainly discusses the problem of the relationship between epistemic fallibilism and the form of falsificationism endorsed by Popper and Lakatos. According to Popperian-Lakatosian view, it is demanded that methodological rules of assessment be unified and applicable to every fully articulated theoretical system. At the same time, falsificationism is expected to reflect and specify some of the central ideas of fallibilism. Fallibilism is in turn based on the assumption that each part of science should be put to continuous criticism. In other words, it is required that no element of the discourse be placed beyond the scope of evaluative procedures. However, as the analysis reveals, falsificationism and fallibilism can hardly go together. Whereas fallibilism states the absolute corrigibility of every piece of knowledge, falsificationism presupposes uncritical acceptance of certain statements and may result in dogmatic rejection of some parts of science. As a result, the model of scientific rationality built upon fallibilism must in important respects differ from that based on falsificationism.