Nieoczekiwani sojusznicy ? Alasdair MacIntyre i Hilary Putnam o racjonalności, realizmie i polityce

In this article philosophical stances of Alasdair MacIntyre and Hilary Putnam are being analyzed and compared with emphasis put on their conceptions of rationality and the problem of realism. It is claimed that what makes their positions very similar is their understanding of rationality and truth as strongly bound with particular tradition of inquiry (tradition relative) but at the same time as tradition transcendent. They also develop similar argumentation on untenability of relativism, obliteration of fact/value dichotomy and methodological unity of all inquiry. Likewise, their views on the problem of realism seem to be largely alike, especially after Putnam’s shift towards so called natural realism. Their political‑cum‑ethical positions are nevertheless more distant (although not as much as it might seem prima facie). It is claimed that the main philosophical reason for this is different understanding of and emphasis they put on the role of tradition of inquiry.