ROBERT SPAEMANN AND ONTOLOGY IN ETHICS (Robert Spaemann i ontologia w etyce)

In the article the author inquires whether Robert Spaemann's naturalistic arguments for the claim that every human being is a person (in his book 'Persons: The Difference Between 'Someone' and 'Something' (Personen. Versuche ueber den Unterschied zwischen 'etwas' und 'jemand'); let us call it 'the personalistic thesis') are successful and whether it is possible to support Spaemann's ethical intuitions in the absence of the personalistic thesis. In particular, he discusses several ontological interpretations of the twin fission phenomenon. He concludes that although Spaemann's arguments are not valid, an alternative argumentation is possible on the basis of the moral importance of the (personal) identity relation and the moral importance of the 'person-making' teleology.