Singulárne podmienky, modifikačné podmienky a heuristika vo vedeckom vysvetlení

The aim of this contribution is to offer a possible interpretation of scientific explanation which draws on the work of J. Woodward. The study begins with an overview of Woodward’s approach to scientific explanation: that is, his distinguishing between (f ) and (f’) demands for valid explanation, his distinguishing between the explanation of a law and the explanation of a unique phenomenon and his demand on the reconstruction of explananda in the course of scientific explanation. There is then a further distinction made between the modificational condition introduced into scientific laws and singular conditions, which are in the course of scientific explanation added from without to scientific laws. This differentiation then enables one to distinguish between the explanation of a law and the explanation of a singular phenomenon. The study ends by showing how explanation comprises heuristic aspects and a change in the original explananda, and delineates several open problems which it is necessary to resolve in the future.