Existenciální tělesnost

The present paper is an interpretation of the absence of systematic analysis of corporeality in Heidegger’s Being and Time. We do not only ask why this analysis is missing, but also in what way it is missing. Heidegger, in fact, avoids the problem of corporeality in a specific way which enables us to think about it a little further than he himself did. Our paper, therefore, is an attempt to present a sketch of what the existential corporeality might eventually consist in. Our aim is not to correct or to fill the gap in Being and Time, but rather to investigate certain possibilities of the existential-analytical thought. Our attempt draws systematically on phenomenological topology: the body (Körper) is understood as a point which provides the centre of the concrete human perspective and the existential corporeality (Leiblichkeit) is understood as a structured whole within which the changes and alternations of the partial corporeal perspectives make sense.