Dyskurs moralny w demokracji podstawą dla tworzenia dobra wspólnego

Socrates pointed out that speaking about the world and actions in a conceptual and evaluative way is based on principles of a linguistic game. This game is revealed in a dialogue, conversation, which refers to something that is equally important for everybody. However, it often happens that the dialogue and discussion between the speakers take the shape of a fight of parties who have opposite goals. Then the opponent is treated as an enemy to defang, ridicule or remove. We hold a discussion because we want to take advantage, have it our own way, and throw aside what is different and unaccepted by us. In the article, the author wonders if the disputes concerning moral values in democracy, their recognition, hierarchisation and preferences may be carried out in a way that assumes reaching the truth together or it is rather impossible. One option that the author takes into consideration is to retreat from objectivity and absolutism in justifications and to replace them with better and worse opinions on a given subject that are more reliable and possible to achieve in a social dialogue of democracy. Openness and non-finality of this settlement may broaden the perspective of agreement and understanding.