GPS/GNSS spoofing and the real-time single-antenna-based spoofing detection system

The idea of C/A codes GPS/GNSS Spoofing (Substitution), or the ability to mislead a satellite navigation receiver into establishing a position or time fix which is incorrect, has been gaining attention as spoofing has become more sophisticated. Various techniques have been proposed to detect if a receiver is being spoofed – with varying degrees of success and computational complexity. If the jammer signals are sufficiently plausible then the GNSS receiver may not realize it has been duped. There are various means of detecting spoofing activity and hence providing effective mitigation methods. In this paper, a novel signal processing method applicable to a single antenna handset receiver for spoofing detection has been described. Mathematical models and algorithms have been developed to solve the problems of satellite navigation safety. What has been considered in the paper is a spoofing detection algorithm based on the analysis of a civil satellite signal generated by mobile C/A GPS/GNSS single-antenna receivers. The work has also served to refine the civilian spoofing threat assessment by demonstrating the challenges involved in mounting a spoofing attack.

---

Opracowanie rekordu w ramach umowy 509/P-DUN/2018 ze środków MNiSW przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (2018).