HARES PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALIZABILITY OF SUPERVENIENCE

The author reconstructs and critcally examines Richard Hare's 'Principles of of Universalizability of Supervenience' and contrasts it with another principle defended by the author of the 'Language of Morals' - the principle of supervenience. It is argued that Hare's views regarding the former underwent a very significant but unjustified change in 'Moral Thinking' as compared with their exposition in his earilier 'Freedom and Reason'. The change considered in a transition from regarding preference utilitarinism as one of many possible normative systems that can be accepted in conformity with universalizability of moral judgments, to treating it as the only normative theory bearing this characteristic. It is also shown that Hare's point of departure chosen in 'Freedom and Reason' allows him to reach merely the principle of universalizability that is equivalent to weak supervenience (according to J. Kim's classification) admitting of singular terms, and that only the latter principle can by recongized as analytically true in moral language.