Popyt na usługi prawne w kontekście samoubezpieczenia i prewencji

In this article we deal with the problem of model to choose a lawyer, which is a combination of self-insurance and prevention (SCIP), in the position of a possible refund in the event of winning the case in court. Firstly this issue was examined by Yafil and Sevi (2005), but only in the context of prevention, which enforces introduction of an additional assumption that the size of the loss is constant, regardless of the costs incurred. In this paper we generalize the Yafila and Sevi’s results, proving that the assumption of constant loss is negligible. We compare the characterized situation to the standard SICP model and prove that the possibility of costs compensation is a sufficient incentive to increase expenses on legal services. We also show that the increase in risk-aversion causes the decline in investment in legal services, where costs can be refunded in the event of winning a court case, which is known not to be true in the standard models of prevention and SICP. Moreover, we prove that, with decreasing absolute risk-aversion, legal services are normal goods, provided that incurred costs can be refunded.