Rola stosunków aktywność-pasywność w Husserlowskiej teorii świadomości

At the very basis of the cognitive efficacy of consciousness there is a domain of passive synthesis, a pre-linguistic and pre-predicative intentionality that Husserl called world-experiencing life (welterfahrenes Leben). It also makes possible thematic consciousness and its connection to the world. Husserl holds the opposed notions of passivity and activity to be functional. What has been actively constituted becomes passive and a basis for higher forms of understanding. The article offers arguments for the above mentioned thesis, taking into account the systematic unity of consciousness. It presents the formal and material aspects of consciousness, the domain of passive synthesis and also the role of reflection for its peculiar autonomy. In the broader view it is easier to explain the meaning of the opposed notions of passivity and activity. The opposition depicts the dynamics of the system of consciousness.