Internalizm w wersjach de dicto i de re w kontekście sporu o kognitywizm metaetyczny

The present paper is devoted to a critical analysis of the de dicto internalist cognitivism (DDIC) theory presented by Jon Tresan. The result is not only a rejection of DDIC, but above all the strengthening of de re internalist non-cognitivism (DRIN) as the most adequate metaethical concept consistent with the position of internalism. DDIC makes the belief that something is morally good/wrong concepts distinctive far beyond necessity. This is due to the rejection of the that-clause, whereby, if a state of mind that a p concept applies to something, it necessarily applies to it, and the attribution to belief that something is morally good/wrong concepts of the status of further entailers, although the propositional content of each state of mind is its intrinsic and non-relational, and not extrinsic and relational, characteristic. Tresan does not notice the advantage of DRIN over his approach because in the course of the argument he confuses the level of concepts with that of terms. The advantages of DRIN are also linked to the ability to explain the source of metaethical disputes. The most important advantage of this approach, however, is its consistency with naturalistic moral realism, which deprives DDIC of the monopoly on being a theory compatible with both internalism and realism, devoid of metaphysical extravagance with regard to the ontological status of moral facts and properties.