NADVLÁDA ÚČELOVÉ RACIONALITY? K INTERPRETACÍM WEBEROVY TYPOLOGIE JEDNÁNÍ

This article discusses various attempts in the Weber literature to reconstruct the logic underlying Weber’s typology of social action and concludes that means-ends rationality enjoys only what has been called a heuristic primacy over other types (Wolfgang Schluchter). The article rejects the claims that value rationality is not a form of rationality or is just a defective form of means-ends rationality. It explores the relationships between subjective types of rationality and objective structures of rationality and concludes that many interpretations under scrutiny here have identified these relationships incorrectly. It is argued that formal rationality cannot be identified with means-ends rationality, or substantive rationality with value rationality. The drawbacks of taking Weber’s statements regarding the priority of means-ends rationality in a substantive sense rather than as a heuristic device are demonstrated on two important interpretations that distort means-ends rationality in Weber: Parsons’ 1937 The Structure of Social Action and Jeffrey Alexander’s 1983 Theoretical Logic in Sociology.