HEMPELOVE ŠTANDARDNÉ PRÍKLADY NA NEKAUZÁLNU EXPLANÁCIU VO SVETLE SKOWOVEJ TEÓRIE KAUZÁLNEJ EXPLANÁCIE

The paper attempts to respond to some possible objections that could be raised by Skow’s theory of explanation against the two standard examples of non-causal explanation given by Hempel. If these objections would prevail the two standard non-causal examples could be reconstructed as causal explanations. In this paper it is argued that this kind of reconstruction is not possible. The article starts with a detailed analysis of Skow’s theory of causal explanation. Subsequently it tries to show that each of Hempel’s examples put up against the potential objections that could be given in terms of Skow’s theory is ultimately resistant to these objections. Finally, the paper’s conclusion is that Skow’s theory although an interesting approach for reconstructing causal explanations fails as an adequate framework for reconstructing Hempel’s standard examples of non-causal explanation.