Podstawowe założenia monizmu absolutnego

The paper is an attempt to reconstruct the main assumptions of the doctrine of absolute monism. I begin with a consideration of the various meanings of the internal relation that was the core of the controversy between logical atomism and neo-Hegelianism. I try to show that, contrary to Russell's thesis, the presupposition that all relations are internal does not directly result in the doctrine of absolute monism. Whitehead's process metaphysics serves as an illustration here. Whitehead holds that all relations are internal and argues, surprisingly to some extent, that only in this way can we avoid monistic consequences. Hence I show that to embrace absolute monism one needs to have additional assumptions. As result we get the three basic assumptions of the doctrine under consideration: to exist in the most fundamental sense is to be independent of anything whatsoever; all relations are internal; every entity is related to every other entity. Additionally there can be at least two versions of absolute monism: procesualistic and substantialistic, depending on whether we accept another assumption, namely, that the fundamental structure of reality consists in substance with its predicates.