THE THEORY OF INTENTIONAL OBJECTS VERSUS THE ADVERBIAL THEORY

AIn this paper the author presents a sketch of a theory of intentionality introducing special entities called intentional objects which can be found in the works of Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden. Nowadays the philosophers that are sympathetic to intentional objects are accused of planting an ontological jungle. All the problems of the theory of intentionality, it is claimed, can be resolved within the framework of a theory assuming a much more parsimonious ontology, like the adverbial theory, a version of which is typically associated with Chisholm. However, he shows that this competitor of the theory of intentional objects faces serious difficulties. The most serious of them is that within the framework of the adverbial theory the relation between the representing entity ('adverbially specified' mental property of the subject) and the external target object has to be construed as primitive, while in the theory of intentional objects it can be easily defined. The consequence is that within the framework of the adverbial theory we are forced to require a distinguished kind of epistemic access not only to the representing entity but also to this 'representing relation'. This consequence, which is very seldom made explicit, seems indeed to be fatal. Intentional objects appear in this light not as products of an ontological extravagance but instead as entities that are indispensable, if we are to be able to explain the phenomenon of intentionality at all.