Mechanizmy kształtowania ładu korporacyjnego stosowane przez fundusze venture capital w inwestycjach w Polsce

The paper deals with the problem of development of the corporate governance structures by venture capital funds in Polish entrepreneurial companies they invested in. In the theoretical part there is a discussion on sources and consequences of agency relationship that exists between funds on one hand and founders and managers of the portfolio companies on the other one. Mechanisms used by VCs are presented that aim at alleviating agency costs, including: ownership structure, voting rights, contract writing, supervising by supervisory board, implementation of motivational mechanisms, investment syndication. Selected factors are presented that may impact the analyzed problem in the Polish context. In the empirical part the theoretical discussion is illustrated with an analysis of twelve companies that underwent initial public offering on the Warsaw stock exchange. Ownership structure and voting rights structure before and after IPO are presented, characteristics of contracts regulating relationship between investors and founders, composition of supervisory boards, characteristics of motivational tools. It was shown that VCs in their portfolio companies aim at possessing dominant ownership position. Contracts between them and entrepreneurs strongly protect interests of investors. They want to safeguard seats in supervisory boards, including chairman position. Motivational mechanisms in companies across several levels of the organizational structure are prepared in order to align investors’ and managers’ goals, usually by issuing shares or options for shares.