Fikcja zdarzenia historycznego w kontekście zasady skargowości. O kradzieży będącej paserstwem (a może odwrotnie?)

The criminal trial is constrained within the bounds set by the indictment filed by the prosecutor. However, as it quite frequently happens, the initial description of the crime in the indictment requires further modifications in the course of the trial. Some of these modifications are rather trivial (date or other quantitative features, venue, etc.) but other, leading to a complete overhaul of the indictment, are quite problematic. As according to the judiciary neither legal qualification nor the de- scription of the indicted crime is binding for the court, only the “historic event” provides bounds for such modifications. Unfortunately, recent Supreme Court rulings seem to be contradictory – some extend the boundaries of modifications to extreme (factual event regardless of its vagueness), while other limit that by claiming that the concept of “historic event” may not be so general to enable a de facto alterna- tive indictment. Has „historic event” as criterion become a pure fiction? Are there any procedural mechanisms to secure the right to defense in case of modifications?