W sprawie granic tolerancji

Our thesis reads: tolerance is not a moral value. There is no moral obligation of being tolerant. Moreover, sometimes we are morally obliged to be intolerant. We define “tolerance” as follows: A person x tolerates a given action of a person y if (x is convinced that there is a person z such that the action of y is bad for z) and (x consciously does not act counter to this act of y). The essence of tolerance should be distinguished from motives of tolerance which may be very varied. Only some of these motives are positively valuable. In the Gospel, there is no absolute dictate of tolerance. On the contrary, we cannot tolerate acts directed towards our neighbors and causing that something bad happens with them. Tolerance of acts directed towards ourselves is a moral duty but only on some conditions, concerning motives of not counteracting. There are at least three limits of tolerance. The first one is of logical character: we can tolerate everything but not intolerance of other people. The second one is of practical character: tolerance should be adequate to «parameters» of tolerated action. The third one is of psychological character: sometimes tolerated actions appear to be psychologically (or also physically) unbearable.