Hegemon or loser? Analysing Germany’s success in theCouncil of the European Union

This paper aims to empirically test the hypothesis, derived from voting power theory, that Germany is the hegemon in the Council of the European Union (the Council), determining bargaining outcomes in this institution and being the most successful in attaining its preferences. This claim, deeply rooted in public opinion and academic literature, is tested by analysing the bargaining success of member states, including Germany, in the Council, as measured as the number of times they contested (voted against or abstained from voting) EU legislative acts in the years 2009-2019. To this aim, three statistical techniques are used: descriptive statistics, linear regression and multidimensional scaling. Overall, the hypothesis of German hegemony has not been corroborated. On the contrary, this country was found to be among the least successful countries in the Council. This conclusion comes from the following findings. First, the analysis of descriptive statistics showed that Germany is one of the countries that most often contests legislation and loses votes in the Council. Second, the linear regression analysis demonstrated that Germany’s success in the Council is statistically significantly lower than that of the other states. As a result, the country is in the narrow group of the three biggest losers in the institution. Third, the multidimensional scaling analysis revealed that Germany has serious difficulty in building winning coalitions and blocking minorities in the Council as it has essentially no permanent or close coalition partner. The paper argues that such a peripheral position for Germany in the Council is due to the radicalism of its preferences and its low propensity to grant concessions in negotiations. The article also predicts that after the UK leaves the EU, Germany will continue to be isolated in the Council and its voting success in this institution will remain low.