Bankowość centralna w świtle doświadczeń dekady 2007-2016. Czy jest miejsce na zmiany strategiczne?

Prior to the financial crisis that erupted in 2007 in the United States, monetary policy had been conducted according to theoretical (new neoclassical synthesis) and practical consensuses (Jackson Hole consensus). These consensuses were combined into the central banks’ strategic frameworks. Monetary strategy goal was established together with reaction function and communication strategy. After eruption of the crisis, the central bank mandate was augmented with the explicit support of financial stability. Most central banks gained a new responsibility – macroprudential policy. The conduct of monetary policy and macroprudential policy under one roof creates a new challenging quality. The article’s goal is to assess the redefinition of monetary policy strategy – or more broadly – central banks’ strategy in the light of their newly acknowledged mandate. Up to 2016 central banks did not present a framework of such an enlarged strategy. This situation seems to be temporary. Modern monetary policy which is still central banks’ mandate must shape economic agents’ expectations. Therefore, a state of affairs when central banks avoid a declaration on their own priorities and possible conflict of goals is dissatisfying.