Marek J. Siemek and His Interpretation of the Idea of Transcendentalism

The paper discusses with critical intent Marek J. Siemek’s conception of transcen-dental philosophy. Firstly, theory of knowledge does not belong to the epistemic level of reflection (Siemek’s stance) but it is precisely the other way around; namely, it is due to transcendental philosophy (critique of cognitive faculties) that it was possible to distinguish metaphysical, ontological and epistemological questions. Secondly, tran-scendental philosophy enables us to discriminate between the ontological and epistemo-logical questions (Emil Lask, Edmund Husserl) and, as a result, to take up within its scope traditional epistemological questions such as adequacy of cognition. Thirdly, Siemek’s Fichtean interpretation of transcendental philosophy is untenable. It overesti-mates the role of spontaneity and practical moment in the constitution of the world and underestimates the receptive moment in cognition. It seems that more plausible way of understanding transcendental philosophy can be found in the writings of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism where within the field of transcendental consciousness more objectified meanings and subject as such are being constituted.