Hegemon czy przegrany? Analiza sukcesu Niemiec w głosowaniach w Radzie Unii Europejskiej

The purpose of the article is to empirically verify the hypothesis, derived from the theory of voting power, that Germany is a hegemon in the Council of the EU, determining the outcomes of negotiations in this institution and being the most successful in attaining its preferences. This claim– firmly rooted in both scientific literature and public opinion – is tested by analyzing the bargaining success of all member states, including Germany, in the Council, measured as the number of times they contested (voted against or abstained from voting) EU legislative acts in the years 2009-2019. Three statistical techniques are used for this purpose: descriptive statistics, linear regression and multidimensional scaling. Overall, the hypothesis on Germany’s hegemony was not corroborated. On the contrary, this country was found to be among the least successful states in this institution. Such a conclusion stems from the following findings. First, the descriptive statistics revealed that Germany is one of the countries that most often contest EU legislation and lose votes in the Council. Second, a linear regression showed that Germany’s success in the Council is statistically significantly lower than that of other member states. As a result, this country is among the three biggest losers in this institution. Third, a multidimensional scaling analysis demonstrated that Germany has major difficulties in building winning coalitions and blocking minorities in the Council, since it has virtually no permanent or close coalition partner. The article argues that such peripheral position of Germany in the Council is due to the extremity of its preferences and its low propensity to grant concessions in negotiations. At the same time, the article predicts that Germany would continue to be isolated in the Council and its success would remain low after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.