Hume proti náboženství

David Hume gave more attention to no subject – except for the history of England – than religion. As is usual with Hume’s philosophical legacy, however, his theory of religion has been subject to a wide range of interpretations, many of which are straightforwardly contradictory – and it is just those which are the focus of the first part of my article. There have, after all, been attempts to present Hume as a theist, fideist, deist, agnostic and atheist. In the second part I will defend the claim that any attempt to categorise Hume according to a single, allegedly true, interpretation, is groundless because every such attempt comes up against insurmountable terminological disputes, interpretational difficulties and doubt concerning argumentation. We do not, however, have to concern ourselves as to what Hume actually thought about religion, or what kind of believer or non-believer he took himself to be. A much more fruitful approach is to understand how Hume’s conception anticipates and enriches contemporary atheology. In the third part I will therefore present textual proof from the primary sources to show how Hume offered a critique of revealed and natural religion, of moral and psychological aspects of religiosity. By way of conclusion, I will reflect on Hume’s conception of “true religion” and its application in secular society.