Karteziánská subjektivita podle „raného“ Levinase

In this text we aim to analyze the Cartesian motifs in the “early” period of Emmanuel Levinas’s thought. Our goal is to explore whether Levinas’s Cartesianism is merely a singular phenomenon, or if it can be set into the wider current of “phenomenologi-cal Cartesianism”. In order to confirm the second possibility, it seems that we must reconstruct the motifs, continuing in Descartes’s specific line of argumentation, which we can directly designate as the “Cartesian way”. These Cartesian motifs can be found in Levinas’s wider context of the issue of subjectivity, and it is these deliberations that form the structure in which the famous formulation of the definition of infinity is made. The first text in which we attempt to identify this general structure that Des-cartes provides for Levinas’s thought and the function that it fulfills in it is Description of Existence. The second motif is Cartesian subjectivity in the book Existence and Existents.