Required Operational Capabilities of the Recognition Subsystem in the Anti-Access/Area Denial System

The subject of this article is the issue of "the required operational capabilities of the reconnaissance subsystem in the anti-access/area denial system". When defining the assumptions for the reconnaissance subsystem in the A2/AD system, several assumptions were adopted for the analyses resulting from the concept of military operations from the beginning of the 21st century. These assumptions were derived from analyses carried out as part of conferences, seminars, research work, and army command and staff exercises (see: Wrzosek, 2020). Moreover, epistemological achievements in the field of military thought were used to generate solutions. The accumulated knowledge is the basis for concluding that the current reconnaissance subsystem does not meet the requirements, full perception of various reconnaissance data obtained from the area of operations and the translation of aggregate knowledge into the cognitive sphere of commanders and staff. Additionally, it was established that in the current organizational and functional solutions, the commander's knowledge is based on an understanding of the area of operation and the enemy troops' situation. Meanwhile, the new scope of reconnaissance tasks under the A2/AD system requires collecting knowledge from all domains where the fate of a military conflict is decided.