The language of legal populism – a philosophical and legal perspective

Populism researchers draw attention to the vital role of language in the implementation of Popularist agenda. This role is discernible in propaganda practices, in attempts to redefine pre-existing notions, and in changing social – but also – linguistic conventions. The recent wave of populism (2010–2021) touches upon law and the rule of law in a special way, and thus phenomena such as propaganda, redefinition of notions and change of convention are often implemented in the field of the language of law. This elaboration is an attempt to analyse the mechanism of changes in the linguistic conventions governing the language of the law and legal language caused by populism, while the tool for this analysis is the philosophy of law applying the achievements of the philosophy of language. Using the concepts and theories proposed by E. Laclau, N. Lacey, R.G. Millikan and F. Recanati, in this study, I explain what the change of legal culture – being conducted by populists – is, defined as a set of linguistic and behavioural conventions relevant to the law. The predominant thesis of the research paper in this area is the claim that the populist change of legal culture consists in turning concepts that are vital for law into empty or constantly floating signifiers, and in destroying legal conventions by 1) ceasing to reproduce behaviours that have so far constituted linguistic and behavioural conventions in the field of law, or 2) initiating the reproduction of new behaviours. In both cases, the modification of the convention entails the loss of their ability to perform functions that are appropriate within the meaning of R.G. Millikan, and thus causes a decline or loss of social usefulness. The analysis carried out enables to draw conclusions as to how the populist change of legal culture can be counteracted.