Psychopatologia doświadczenia czasu w ujęciu nieredukcjonistycznym. Kilka uwag metodologicznych

The article addresses several difficulties associated with applying the concept of lived time in the phenomenological psychopathology. The author distinguishes lived time from clock time and argues that a translation of natural-scientific findings on clock time perception into categories of lived experience and vice versa is problematic. Simultaneously, it is claimed that measurements of the clock constitute a part of the reflective experience of time. This is illustrated by the phenomenon of synchrony, which is equally unconscious, biological and embodied as well as mediated by conceptual forms of the clock. The argument differentiates three layers of temporal experience – fully unconscious, prereflective (implicit), and reflective one. Taking advantage of a hermeneutic phenomenological reasoning, the author also ponders the question of the entanglement and asymmetry between past and future. It is claimed that a healthy balance between these two dimensions of lived time requires both a continuity of lived experience and a possibility to accommodate the unpredictable. Finally, the paper proposes to include the dimensions of historicity and finitude into discussions on lived time as indispensable for any meaningful account of temporal experience.

Projekt "Pathologies of temporality. Abnormal experiences of time in mental disorders" finansowany ze środków Unii Europejskiej w ramach Europejskiego Programu Badawczo-Innowacyjnego Horyzont 2020, umowa numer 659205.